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Introduction 
Recent IED events in the Middle East and Iraq have witnessed the Baghdad Al-Aimma bridge 
incident, where several hundred children and women were trampled to death at the mere mention 
of a suicide bomber in the vicinity; a female involved in the Jordan bombings, allegedly because 
her brothers were killed by Coalition forces; soaring Iraqi casualty rates; increasing frequency of 
Iraqi children involved in emplacing roadside bombs, and teens now driving suicide bomb 
vehicles; and most recently, increasing export of terrorism outside Iraq’s borders (Amman).  
More importantly, we are currently letting the terrorist and insurgents pick the time and place of 
their information operations in today’s Iraq. We appear to be fighting the enemy’s fight, and only 
addressing the symptoms and not the causes of the larger battle by cleverly copying enemy fliers, 
or mirroring their themes in our psychological operations efforts. 
We must not continue to ‘fight their fight.’ If we do the results will be likely prove disastrous. 
One insurgent video that was being passed around the streets of Baghdad in the fall of 2004 
shows an IED attack from the triggerman's vantage point as he patiently waits for the right 
moment to detonate a bomb inside an old car a hundred yards down a busy Baghdad street. After 
U.S. soldiers pass by, a young boy and a girl walk between them and the car. Yet the bomber 
does not hesitate to detonate, and in the last frame, a fireball roars up the street toward the boy 
and girl. The deeper ‘information’ significance for us is that it clearly shows that young 
‘insurgents-for-hire’ are increasingly killing other Iraqi youths. We often overlook key scenes in 
enemy video that can be used by the Iraqi Government to inform and influence. For example in 
this video an age-old Iraqi Army marching cadence is set to new lyrics urging Iraqis everywhere 
to kill and maim the generic "enemy." 
We could put out our own videos highlighting the carnage from these attacks. But this would only 
highlight that we are failing to protect the average Iraqi citizen in Baghdad. We could emphasize 
that the terrorists are contravening religious precepts from the Quran and Hadith. But religious 
motivation appears to be less of a factor in suicide bombings than previously thought and the 
question of jihad appears interpretive for the enemy. In order to combat these disturbing videos 
and the fomenting of unrest in the region through television and Internet programs might require a 
Creative Use of the Media program featuring a cataloging of existing programs in the region that 
have proved effective against terrorists and insurgents: the humor campaign run by the Egyptian 
government; the recent Syrian Soap Opera Al-Hur Al-Ayn; and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s 
Terrorism in the Grip of Justice TV program(s). 
However effective these are only small steps in the overall scheme of things. If we are truly 
serious about a sustained effort we must adopt and overall framework or new way of looking at 
information operations in this age of Irregular Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare and Counter-
insurgency, or Global Jihad. Therefore, an innovative IO campaign which prevents the 
recruitment of Islamic jihadists from abroad and paid-for-hire insurgents inside Iraq as well as 
disengages them in custody seems increasingly imperative in this new context. 
Another more basic challenge is framed for us by the current Iraq experience. How do we break 
the ‘social contract’ of the streets that is attracting so many paid-for-hire insurgents? Potential 
insurgents, particularly in the Baghdad area increasingly seeing the appeal or incentive of taking 
$20, $50, or increasingly $100 and in some cases as little as a pack of cigarettes to emplace and 
IED device and engage and become a hero.[1] The alternative is that Government or Coalition 
Forces hand them $5 and they stick to cleaning up trash now ubiquitous around the city. 
At present there is little deterrence for would-be recruits to engage in the first option: they can 
more or less meld into the population after the act; they will not be killed from the air in a violent 
Predator strike; the Iraqi Police are not on patrol, but are bunched up at the local Police 
department headquarters; their heroics are likely to be captured by an enterprising colleague 
(cameraman) at close-range; and if they do get captured they are likely never to go further than a 
Brigade Interrogation Facility, which has a shortage of trained interrogators—and even if they go 
to a regional correctional facility, it is likely they can visit with relatives, continue to coordinate with 
fellow insurgents, and the Iraqi Tribunal will turn them out on the streets in months due to 
“incomplete evidence.” 
Still another most disturbing challenge or trend is the increasing number of young people and 
females being rounded up by authorities in Iraq for engaging in IED activities. On September 28, 
2005 a woman suicide bomber from Zarqawi’s Al Qaida Organization in the Land of Two Rivers 
blew herself up at an Iraqi police station in Tall Afar, killing five people.[2] In an October border 
operation near Tall Afar, Iraqi officials related to us that they just captured a 10-year old Syrian 
boy who had “come to wage jihad.”[3] The 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s 
squadron intelligence officer recently reportedly seeing children placing roadside IEDs, including 
a 14-year old girl while on patrol just south of Baghdad.[4] In November 2005, a fourth would-be 
suicide bomber in the Amman bombings was reported to be an Iraqi female. In fact, these trends 
buttressed a previous rumor that more Iraqis were reportedly signing up to be suicide bombers—
something unheard of in the insurgency’s early days. 
Perhaps the most difficult and self-critical challenge to confront is that the criticisms of the United 
States that dominate Iraq and the region may reflect policy resentments, and not perception 
problems at all. Thus a policy focused solely at changing perceptions is likely to be stillborn. Many 
of the world’s children and many adults already relate to American society and people with 
“respect, understanding, and a sense of common interest and common values.”[5] This became 
evident in the aftermath of the wedding bombings in Jordan. This is why innovative informing and 
not just influencing programs will continue to be important, 
A Way Ahead 
Our debriefings from Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo increasingly show us that the enemy is far 
from monolithic in their motivations and agendas. Some are motivated by religion and social 
factors in and outside Iraq, such as Sunni insurgents and Islamic jihadists entering Iraq, but in 
fact a large number could be categorized as "paid-for-hire" insurgents.  
Unfortunately, many of our IO campaigns in Iraq continue to operate from the opposite 
assumption. Therefore we fail to focus our IO efforts directly at the insurgents whom we see as 
intractable. Yet we cannot win the counterinsurgency by focusing solely on the population, nor 
can we win by focusing solely on enemy High Value Individuals. We must focus our efforts at 
preventing the enemy foot-soldiers from enjoining the battle, and on the other end disengaging—
or dissuading, deterring, and turning them when possible. 
There are some emerging trends that support a comprehensive prevention and disengagement 
IO campaign. However we must not only have a quick reaction capability in Iraq, we must 
maintain one throughout the region. The two capabilities are inextricably linked. 
The Coalition and its regional partners are starting to see the power of productively harnessing 
the outrage of Iraqi and Muslim families, from Beirut to Baghdad to Damascus to Amman. 
Decidedly anti-terrorist TV programs like the Iraqi Terrorism in the Grip of Justice show and the 
Syrian produced Al-Hur Al-Ayn soap opera are increasingly popular across Iraq and the Middle 
East. 
The targeting of civilians, including women and children, which was often lost amongst the daily 
chaos in Iraq, has now come to the light of day in the wake of the horrible Jordan wedding 
bombing. Citizens across the Middle East, as we saw in Lebanon last year, are starting to say 
kafeya, or “enough!” Tribal and religious leaders inside and outside Iraq who formerly kept their 
criticisms to themselves to preserve a united front against Coalition Forces have begun to speak 
out against violence by both sides, sparking debate on the morality of urban warfare. 
Growing splits among jihadists are beginning to undermine the theological and legal justifications 
for suicide bombing. As that emerging schism takes its toll on the jihad movement, it could 
represent an opportunity for the West to combat jihadism itself. Sadly, we do not seem to have 
capitalized on these regional events and their explicit and implicit vulnerabilities in a focused 
manner.  
1. Prevent Islamic Jihadists and Paid-for-Hire Insurgents from Signing Up in the First Place 
We know that mass recruiting of foreign jihadists takes place at the pilgrimages to Mecca and 
Medina and other Muslim holy places. We need to work with governments to develop public 
information campaigns informing pilgrims passing through their borders to be careful not to let 
people take advantage of them during this time of religious fervor and to avoid potential zealots 
and recruiters.  
At the same time, for a more localized perspective, we need to keep the ‘paid-for-hire’ insurgents 
off the street by supporting Iraqi Government programs that build and invest in a long-term future 
for them. The Iraqi Government might address holding the families of young IED emplacers, 
transporters, and spotters socially or financially accountable—i.e. this is nothing to be proud of, 
and nothing to profit from. 
2. Disengage the Detainee Population 
At present the detainee operation in Iraq has some serious challenges. We are taking risk where 
there is no opportunity and failing to take advantage where there is substantial opportunity. 
Aggressive interrogations and absurd scare tactics may make the Coalition feel better in the 
short-run, but this clumsy approach has little return on investment for enhanced effectiveness on 
the battlefield or putting down a counterinsurgency. 
More importantly, after arriving at Brigade Internment and Coalition Correctional Facilities many 
detainees aren’t interacted with, interviewed, or debriefed for weeks or months after arriving. In 
many cases we have only provided a “container” for them, inside which they can network and 
become even more radicalized. 
And there is even more trouble on the horizon: U.S. authorities posit that many youth—those 
under 18 years of age—currently being held will be turned out on the street as the prison system 
is increasingly turned over to the Iraqi Government. It is therefore imperative that we address 
these changing dynamics as soon as possible. 
But an IO campaign focused on a prevention strategy isn’t good enough. It must be coupled with 
an equally innovative disengagement strategy: one that disengages those already in the radical 
ranks through a highly-nuanced influence campaign that starts with detainees, whose future 
potential to do ill or good we often ignore. We are learning that jihadists are not monolithic in their 
desire to commit suicide to attain salvation, and many are manipulated into this dire last act. 
One of the Jordanian bombers apparently was in our custody in Iraq and we let him go. 
Unfortunately this is symptomatic of greater dysfunction across current Coalition and Iraqi 
Government detainee operations, and tragically manifests itself in enhanced enemy freedom of 
action on the battlefield. 
There is a better way. There is a growing feeling among some academics studying Muslim issues 
that there is much to be gained by disengaging those involved in radical activities before they 
become full-fledged terrorists as well as youth who have not fully developed a sense of right and 
wrong but may be in confinement for committing terrible acts. 
One way to engage these individuals is to have a mullah sit down and talk to them; another might 
be to use other types of influence-maker in more secular settings where one might use a sports 
figure, or even a family member. One such program being conducted at present has produced a 
very low recidivism rate. 
By following a policy of disengagement, we can turn a vulnerability—high detainee throughput 
and recidivism—into an opportunity. An information campaign should start by focusing on our 
current detainee population, who can then go out and do our bidding if we are successful. 
3. Demystify the Terrorists and Insurgents: Harness Outrage before Tragedy Strikes 
One video we acquired on the streets of Baghdad targets Iraqi youth and combines spiritual as 
well as elements of emotional exploitation in an attempt to mystify terrorists and insurgents as 
martyrs. 
This video features a direct appeal to a young man’s desire to become a zefa or an escort of the 
beautiful virgins occupying paradise or heaven. Here the enemy is appealing to what is denied 
the youth in life—al-hur al-ayn (the beautiful ladies of paradise). The theme, which guides many 
of these homemade videos, is “The Winds of Victory,” which features an eerie, howling wind that 
announces the beginning of each video. The above-noted video features each dead martyr, one-
by-one ascending into heaven—or toward the light. However, one should note that in this 
scenario their ascent begins in the basement, from which one could conclude that this is where 
the United States and Israel have placed them. The commentary accompanying the video as 
narrated by a fellow dead martyr continues:  
“In the name of God of the Kabba, I did win. God Bless him. Don’t be sorry… he is alive 
and happy in heaven. He said goodbye to the Earth. In Heaven, his destiny is eternity.”  
This video also illustrates emotional exploitation—the same sort of dead ancestor worship that 
the IRA and other terrorist groups and gangs have used in the past.  
Generally in these videos, the jihadists make themselves appear heroic, but in fact they are 
ruthlessly killing bystanders and children. Their form of “suicide” is only in part voluntary, as 
illustrated by one video that illustrates a jihadist getting hustled out of bed early in the morning, 
and into the truck still looking dazed. By doing the forensics on these videos, the countervailing 
message one might cull from them is that the people these youths have come to fight for in turn 
don’t value them as human beings. 
One can look both inside and outside Iraq for encouraging programs that demystify terrorists, and 
that should be proliferated. Iraqi families and communities are unrealized assets and resources 
that must be mustered by the Iraqi government in order to stem the daily violence and extremism 
directed at Iraqi youth. Iraqi mothers are figures of authority and in many ways are the emotional 
voice of the community. An effective program currently being used by Iraqi Ministry of Interior 
officials is to line-up local and foreign insurgents and film them being confronted by grieving and 
sometimes hysterical mothers and family members. This is the Terrorism in the Grip of Justice 
nightly TV program shown on al-Iraqiya at 17:00 Baghdad time. The mothers involved in this 
program are effective because they are past the point of fear—still ubiquitous among their 
neighbors. They have already lost everything. However, the real challenge that remains for 
Coalition and Iraqi authorities is organizing these mothers and harnessing the power of their 
collective emotional voice in a more effective longer-term approach—before the deaths of more of 
their sons and daughters. 
4. Develop a Regional Quick Reaction Program 
In the greater Middle East, particularly in the wake of the Palestinian Prime Minister Hariri’s 
assassination earlier this year and the more recent Jordan bombings, we must be ready to 
capitalize, mobilize, and organize when and where the terrorists have overreached and outraged 
local populations. 
Our "deep IO" programs must attack the jihadists on both the theoretical and emotional levels. 
One could argue the prevailing jihadist theoretical technique consists of saying that there is 
religious sanction for the killing of Muslim civilians, and that neither the innocent victims nor the 
bombers are doomed to suffer in hell. Jihadist claims about the certainty of salvation—whether it 
be meeting their recently departed relatives or virgins of paradise—could be the most important 
emotional techniques in their recruitment efforts. We can’t afford to fight the enemy’s IO fight, 
which is what we have been doing when it comes to IEDs. The highlighting of enemy killing of 
innocents in our pro-Iraq ads can cut both ways—it can further enrage citizens and at the same 
time make us look more powerless to protect them. 
5. Catalog, Create, and Reinforce Creative Use of Media Programs 
The “catastrophic terrorism” we are seeing imported into Iraq has more in common with the 
gunman as poseur, i.e., the Red Brigades, than with traditional terrorist organizations. The Iraqi 
Ministry of Interior has seized on this poseur vulnerability with their Terrorists in the Grip of 
Justice TV program by showing the startling transformation of the former poseur into a quivering 
wreck—lined up against the wall, waiting to feel an innocent family’s wrath. 
Abdullah Bjad, a Saudi who writes the script for the controversial anti-terrorism Syrian TV soap 
Al-Hur Al-Ayn (which refers to the 70 virgins militants say will meet the martyrs, at the first drop of 
their blood), said that just before one of the 2003 attacks on a residential compound in Saudi 
Arabia an attacker who was in contact with his superiors was ‘heard on the mobile phone 
counting the seconds to Al-Hur Al-Ayn. His last words were, “One second to Al-Hur Al-Ayn.” He 
then blew himself up. The series focuses on the influence of underground clergymen luring young 
men from the more moderate message of other clerics, and brainwashing them into becoming 
suicide bombers. The serial is aimed at those who have not made up their mind about terrorism 
yet. Bjad said he felt the show offered a way to counter radical views: 
“In the serial we refute every militant argument by referring to the Quran.” Najdat Anzour, 
the Syrian director, said that “no one can deny that one of the reasons that push terrorists 
to commit terrorism is a concept in terrorist literature, ‘blow yourself up so you can meet 
Al-Hur Al-Ayn.’”[6] 
In the wake of the Jordan bombings, these beliefs and claims are beginning to appear unstable to 
a majority of onlookers in the greater Middle East, and they may in fact comprise the movement’s 
Achilles heel.[7] 
6. Youth May be the Center of Gravity in the Long War: Focus Messages on Life and 
Opportunity 
The Iraqi Government and the Coalition need to focus on enigmatic messages promoting life, 
community, and nation. They must also realize that an IO strategy based on youth isn’t soft—
giving out candy. Iraqi and Muslim youth have become the center of gravity for the information 
war. We can’t afford to fight the enemy’s IO fight, which is what we have been doing when it 
comes to recent C-IED IO campaigns. The graphic highlighting of the enemy’s killing of innocents 
in our pro-Iraq ads can cut both ways—it can further enrage citizens and at the same time make 
us look more powerless to protect them. 
In the past year, with the Bali and London bombings, it has become increasingly obvious that the 
success of the terrorist movement rests on the vulnerability of youth—worldwide. The smiling face 
of Amrozi, the young Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist responsible for the Bali bombing, showed the 
world that terrorists recruit those who are psychologically disturbed and hence highly susceptible 
to their brainwashing and exploitation. The “American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh, from 
Afghanistan, and the Pakistani youth involved in the most recent London bombings, offer further 
examples of this trend of multi-faceted exploitation—if not outright brainwashing. 
Many say that the defining elements of today’s Islamic terrorist are a nihilistic destructiveness 
born of a psychological malaise widespread among many radicalized and often well-educated 
young Islamic men who believe that a world dominated by western political ideals, culture, and 
economics holds nothing of them.[8] 
Al Qaida in Iraq operatives, foreign fighters, and local Iraqi insurgents are increasingly exploiting 
Iraqi youth in the current conflict. The exploitation of Iraqi youth takes many forms: mental, 
emotional, spiritual, and physical exploitation often leading to their untimely death. Perhaps the 
worst form of genocide is taking place as Iraqi youth are increasingly killing other Iraqi youth. The 
mechanism is the ubiquitous roadside bomb as young paid-for-hire insurgents emplace bombs by 
the side of the road to be triggered by operatives.[9] Often these bombs led to the death of other 
young Iraqis. 
What are some positive steps we might take from a policy perspective? We need to continue our 
efforts to demystify the terrorists while at the same time focusing on a three-pronged plan for Iraqi 
youth: “Saving a life, giving a life, and building a life.” 
We have focused much effort on saving lives through the heroic efforts of Iraqi and Coalition 
police and security forces to save the lives of as many Iraqi youth as possible. We have focused 
much effort on giving lives to those Iraqi youth we have taken off the street and delivered into the 
hands of courageous Muslim NGOs and a few western NGOs that have in large part fulfilled their 
immediate needs for food and shelter. 
Where we have not put as much effort is toward helping these mentally, emotionally, and 
physically displaced Iraqi youth build lives for themselves: Instead we have relied on quick-fixes 
like giving them sticks, and asking them to pick up trash—among them many college students. 
This means not just teaching them a trade in Iraq, which may or may not be needed in the new 
market, thereby contributing to pervasive ‘underemployment’ problems—but helping them build a 
life and a career as a manager and a leader. We might send youth overseas to learn how to 
become entrepreneurs in safer countries like Dubai and Lebanon, under mentorship from 
business and civic leaders. 
We need to send Iraqi society a clear signal that we are willing to invest in their future, and not 
simply be content to create a “nation of coolies to support Western investment opportunities” as 
one observer recently noted. 
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